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cler who causes the sun to rise with his crow; in the pragmatist a Prometheus who ravishes the fire of truth from heaven to prepare the human feast withal; in the realist a Hercules whose twelve labors are to clear away the underbrush of human superstition and ineptitude.

In sad, sober, earnest, philosophy's trouble is not that it is not literary enough. Philosophy's trouble is being too literary. Philosophers are not crippled with blindness to "life's third dimension." They are marred with sensitiveness to too many additional dimensions. They do not make the world poorer, they trouble it rather with surfeit. Their craft does not suffer from too little art; it suffers from too much art. Far from lacking the gift of tongues, philosophy has so many that they make a babel.

For men may philosophize as a slave labors or a bird sings. A philosophy is extorted from men by the environment which clamors to be socially known, understood, and controlled, on the penalty of pain and of death. Again, a philosophy may be the inevitable and spontaneous flowering of the human spirit, just the actualization of one of the potencies of organic existence, just birds singing. Our world being what it is, either of these types by itself, is bad. The domination of the first type—historically represented by the patristic and theological philosophies—is perverting and illiberal; the domination of the second type—historically represented by the various psychologisms and idealisms—is at least, trivial, ultimately, suicidal. A good philosophy may be neither slavish or earthy, in bondage to thoughts and things, nor irrelevant and anarchic, in bondage to human nature alone. In the long run philosophy has been perhaps too human, too much concerned with merely our hopes and ideals, too unconcerned with the real, actual world which is the condition of their realization and satisfaction. If the "new" philosophy is to save philosophy, it will not turn philosophers into poets, it will turn philosophers into scientists. It will, in aim and method, fuse the labor and the song, identify instrument and end, service with self-expression, truth with excellence. In philosophizing, the "new" philosophy will say, let use be married to joy.

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KNOWLEDGE AND VOLITION

CENTRAL in modern epistemology is the problem of the relation between knowledge and volition. The omnipresent tendency of recent psychology to conceive of the various functions of mental life as thoroughly interrelated and subordinated to action has re-

sulted in a new conception of the place of intellect. Knowledge and volition are no longer conceived to be disjunct activities, but as mutually dependent—no will without idea, no idea apart from will. From the connection of the two, far-reaching deductions as to the fundamental character of reality have been drawn. Scientific psychology has apparently lent support to the theory of the primacy of will—hence a new impetus to Neo-Fichtean speculation. It is my purpose, so far as possible in a short paper, to set forth certain misconceptions which I believe to inhere in recent discussions of this problem and so, as result, to win some greater clearness as to the genuine solution. Rickert in Germany, Royce and Münsterberg in this country, have made most prominent speculative capital out of the alleged connection between will and cognition, and I shall use the views of these thinkers as a basis for a critical inquiry.

Despite many differences of detail, the argument of all thinkers of this school is clear and single. The judgment is the unit of knowledge—the judgment is essentially the affirmation of the meaning of an idea. The object of knowledge has no real presence in the mind, but only appears there vicariously through the ideas used in judgment. But the mere existence of ideas in the mind does not itself suffice for knowledge. In night-dream and day-dream, in inattentive perceptual experience, ideas lie in the mind as a picture stands in its frame, but nevertheless, do not know. In order to know, ideas must be *employed*; they must be affirmed, asserted, or recognized (“*bejaht*” or “*anerkannt*”)—but “assertion” is an act of will; hence all knowledge is voluntary.

Yet it would be quite too naïve to suppose that knowledge is contained in the mere assertion of an idea. If assertion is voluntary merely, one could assert or deny anything. Any wanton suggestion, if affirmed, would be true. What makes the difference between true assertion and false assertion? The element of assertion differentiates the judgment from the mere assumption or suggestion, but, belonging to both true and false judgment, can not serve as criterion between them. The standard of judgment does not lie within mere assertion, yet can not lie outside of judgment. There is no exit from idea into reality. One can not somehow stand above both and, by comparing, declare whether the idea is true of the fact. Such a comparison could be effected only by means of another idea, whose truth would require for its determination a further comparison and use of an idea, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The standard of truth must lie within the judgment function. If not in the idea, and not in assertion as such, then where?

The answer, according to Rickert, is to be derived from the following considerations. Although assertion is voluntary, it is not

therefore capricious. The normal act of will is determined by values, that is, by feelings, and feelings are always pleasure and pain. The judgment expresses a genuine interest. Yet the value which the judgment expresses is no ordinary one, relative to the moment and the individual. It is authoritative like the prompting of conscience, a Kantian imperative, timeless and eternal, in the realm of intellect, overruling caprice and mere individual preference. And just as the Kantian moral law was revealed to the conscience and became efficacious through the feeling of "respect," so this imperative manifests itself in a *peculiar* feeling, that of *certainly*, the "Drang" which accompanies all cognitive acts. Yet, though timeless and constraining, the "ought" of the intellectual conscience, like the moral law, is autonomous, its binding force depends on the individual "will to know." This ought is the genuine object of knowledge, and the Being which other epistemological theories regard as that *about* which I judge, is really *that which* I ought to judge. An object, a being, is not ready-made and inviting to judgment—for all that is found is content of consciousness—it is a something actively wrought by the judgment, not the product of capricious manufacture, of course, but of a lawful and careful art. An object, an independent being controlling our fancy and guiding our knowledge, has no meaning for us except that which we ought to recognize.

Royce, accepting in general the foregoing analysis and supporting it by the recent psychological doctrine of the "motor aspect" of ideas, explicitly identifies the meaning of an idea with the will of an idea, and uses this identification as the basis of the most insistent theodicy which has yet appeared and of the entire voluntaristic side of his idealistic Spinozism. Rickert leaves the ought in the shape of a Kantian imperative, Royce erects it into a metaphysical entity. The reasoning is briefly put thus. The true judgment, according to the foregoing, is one which conforms to the intellectual ought. But a mere ought is no more valid in the sphere of thinking than in any other realm of activity. The ought is authoritative only if it expresses my own will. If those ideas are true which I ought to assert, then those are true which express my will. Or, since truth is the fulfillment of the meaning of our ideas, and that meaning is their will, the truth must fulfill the will, wherefore the universe must be ultimately satisfactory, not, to be sure, to this momentary complaining self of mine, but to that self which, in judging things to be as they are, expresses its will in so judging. If we did not will to find things as they are, we should never be able to complain of them. Since, lastly, the interest which truth expresses is permanent and universal, it is no mere empirical interest, but the interest or the will of the absolute (the "over-individual" will) with which we feel our-

selves identical whenever we experience the compulsion which attaches to all true ideas.

Such, in brief, is the argument. Is it cogent?

No one nowadays would venture to deny that ideas are motor or that in judgment they are more than a mere train, being combined with an element corresponding to what is meant by "assertion." There is a difference in character between the idea which is a representative of reality, the idea of San Francisco, for example, and the mere fancy, such as, say, Cloud Cuckooland. Undoubtedly this character is connected with the motor side of mental life. Knowledge is, then, an act, and so may be called an affair of will, in the widest sense. Yet because ideas are motor they are not for that reason voluntary, and because knowledge is an act it is not therefore purposive. To believe so is to fall back from Spinoza to Descartes.

One initial mistake on Rickert's part consists in separating the element of assertion or recognition from the idea. According to his analysis there are *two* things in knowledge: an idea, and the affirmation thereof, the one passive, the other active. In fact, however, the idea is itself active and affirms itself. Knowledge does not involve the willing consent of the self to the idea. The process is single; an objectifying idea. Call up any memorial idea. Or consider again the idea of San Francisco. In itself it is assertive.

This false separation appears most flagrant in Rickert's interpretation of every judgment as the affirmation or rejection of a neutral suggestion, as the answer, "yes" or "no" to a question.¹ If the content of every question were actually quite neutral, how could it ever be answered? A question can be answered only because it already contains, in part, the affirmation of an object. Every question implies a previous affirmation, every doubt implies knowledge. If every judgment could be turned into a genuine question, there would be no possibility of knowledge. As a fact, of course, certain judgments can be questioned only rhetorically, not really. There are ideas which affirm themselves and on the basis of these every question is answered. Such ideas are, for example, true perceptual ideas.

The element of assertion is, then, not really separable from the idea, is not something external to it. It is intrinsic to the idea itself. The idea is not "lifeless like a picture on a panel, but is the very act of the understanding itself."

Furthermore, it is a mistake on Rickert's part to regard this element of assertion as determined by a preceding feeling, that of certainty. Certainty does not precede the affirmation of an idea, but rather accompanies it. It is not as if we said, such an idea is pleasant to entertain, such an idea would realize my interests, *therefore*, I

¹ "Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis," p. 108.

judge. Certainty inheres in the very act of affirmation. Idea, assertion, certainty are simultaneous elements of one single process, the process of judgment. Certainty is strictly analogous either to the pleasures which accompany any successful action or to the sensuous and esthetic feelings. Like the latter it may imply a prearranged adequacy between the organ, that of a cognition, and the object, which impels the one to keep in contact with the other. Such is the certainty which attends perceptual experience and all genuinely *a priori* knowledge. Like the former, it may demand a winning of this adequacy, as is the case with all meditated cognition. In both cases, however, it is an incident of a process, not the instigator of a process. Certainty is the feeling which attends the attainment and maintenance of an affirmation. It is, then, not a value which determines the judgment. And it is a *must*, not an ought. I can not help breathing in the odor of a rose, be it ever so slightly; nor can I keep myself from avoiding the prick of its thorns.

It is no confirmation of this view of the judgment as moral and self-expressive to urge, as does Professor Royce,² that we often, in reply to the question why we believe a thing, say that we do so because it is reasonable or sensible and the like. This recognition of the rational is moral only if it involves love of rationality as attested by the pursuit of truth, not when it is forced by the mere "evidence" of rationality. Rationality may be as insistent as sneezing and on occasions no less distasteful. Those most certain of all truths, those of immediate experience, as Rickert himself attests, are, moreover, the most mechanically insistent of all. It is equally misleading to assert that we acknowledge present facts because by so doing we can the better realize our will.

It follows that the act of assertion is not voluntary and that the attendant feeling of certainty has no moral significance. The latter is analogous to the immediate and uninvited pleasures of warmth or sunlight or beauty; the former to any involuntary act like winking or blushing. Knowledge comes for the most part unsought and through most of our lives the self-conscious will to know is in abeyance. There is a very narrow limit to our power of self-persuasion: we believe or disbelieve chiefly because we must. The expression of knowledge in words or writing is mostly voluntary, but the knowledge itself is simply there, and even when we toilsomely seek the truth, it is the seeking which expresses our conscious will, but our acknowledgments, when the truth is found, are not voluntary, for we must acknowledge. There can be, therefore, no "ought" in knowledge. There is possibility of duty only where an act can be controlled by a deeper purpose, when it can express an aim or ideal

² "The World and the Individual," Second Series, Lecture I.

which precedes it. Knowledge may result from a plan of study or research, and so, in that sense fulfill an aim, but over its character, over the particular judgments that are made, there is no control. That we know at all is partly our affair; but what we know, the meaning of our ideas, we can not predetermine. We voluntarily give ourselves the opportunity to judge, but we can not judge voluntarily. Our ideas affirm themselves wholly apart from whether we like it or dislike it, our convictions, our very hypotheses, for the most part force themselves upon us quite independently of our conscious desire. They are analogous rather to our habits, instincts, and reflexes than to our volitions, and may be either indifferent wholly to these latter as seeing the third dimension is, or in opposition to them as stuttering is to one thus afflicted.

Of course there is a voluntary element in the construction of hypotheses and in the meaning of some of our symbols, as well as in some of our beliefs. But even these are based on a fund of objectifying ideas (intents) which are simply given and to which we are compelled willy-nilly to assent. In our more thoughtful and voluntary scientific work our will can only, through attending, relax or maintain the intents that crowd into the field of consciousness. We can say that they express our will only so far as they awaken in us the pleasure that welcomes or the pain that rejects. Mathematical work illustrates this. We find given a region of intents which in manifold directions impels us on to fulfillment and extension; our will is concerned only in the choosing of the way, not in the choice of the ways, and when once we have chosen we must needs follow on. The will can only select and to a limited extent rearrange a given material.

Moreover, the amount of correspondence which our ideas shall have in order to be true can not be selected by our will. We can, to be sure, will to mean only a small part of our object, as when we will that our figures³ shall mean only the numerical properties of objects, but at the cost of partial knowledge. In so doing we select from the whole given intention, from the entire object meant, such parts as we wish to deal with. And over this total region of intention we have no control. If our idea is true only so far as useful, like a tool, it will be only half true just as all that is useful is only a small part of all that is. Complete truth requires that the whole object shall be there in the idea; that the entire intention shall be realized, not a willfully selected part of it.

Indeed just as in order to act voluntarily I must have a given organized structure of reflexes and habits, so I can purpose only because I can mean. I can define will in terms of intent, but not

³ *L. c.*, p. 303.

vice versa. To will is to find pleasure in an idea and to begin to realize it through action, to have a hand in its actualization. If our ideas did not have objectifying power, could not assert an object apart from the will, we could never choose between possible courses of action, never fashion any ideal into the matter of the world. If the absolute is will, it must choose between possibilities, that is, it must select from ideas which mean possible objects independently of its volition. To fulfill the meaning of an idea may involve the carrying out of a plan, but the plan could not be executed unless the idea apart from the will meant the object which verifies it. It is not because our will is better expressed in the laws of the world that we can not fly, but because our intent is thus fulfilled. And over the fulfillment of this intent we have no control.

That it is impossible to identify the meaning of an idea with the will of an idea becomes manifest if we consider our ideas of the past. There are none of our ideas more full of intent, more saturated with the affirmation of objects. And there are none that have so little of our will in them. What we here mean we can no longer act upon to perfect or destroy. How often do we wish that we could get rid of the meaning of our memories, of their reference to a world which we are compelled to acknowledge as our own. To be sure, we can, somewhat at will, determine *whether* we shall remember or not, but the important thing is beyond our control—namely, *what we shall remember*, the objectifying intent of our ideas. And if we dwell on the past, getting a wider and fuller content for our ideas, we win a partial fulfillment of meaning, but for the most part no realization of what we want, and, of course, in many cases such a thwarting of our will that we turn away from our own intents. Thus plainly may our intent be fulfilled, but not our will. It is at best an equivocation to say that the acknowledgment of a bygone deed that eats out one's heart is the expression of one's purpose. There is no purpose where there is not conscious desire. There is no more purposiveness or moral quality in such acts than there is in hunger or in the impulsion of a fixed idea.

But may we not, with Münsterberg in his recent book, "The Eternal Values," give us the "ought" as object of knowledge and retain "value"? We have already observed that the value of knowledge is similar to the esthetic values—like the beauty of a landscape it is immediate, unsought, beyond the control of the will. In the experience of beauty we enjoy and we must enjoy; we have no choice, and therefore feel the compulsion of no ought. Nevertheless, beauty is a value, in it the will *finds* itself expressed. May not the truth of an idea be similarly an immediate value which, qualifying it, serves as standard?

Clearness in this matter requires that we keep in mind certain distinctions which have already been drawn. Knowledge may have either of two values: extrinsically, so far as useful in the guidance of other activities, and intrinsically, as the successful fulfillment of the cognitive function. The former, *pace* the pragmatist, may be omitted from the discussion, since it forms no part of the essence of knowledge itself. In the latter, we must again distinguish, first the value of the strictly voluntary activity of setting a goal of knowledge and through scientific research realizing it; where the value is not different from that which attaches to the accomplishment of any purpose; second, the peculiar and immediate value, namely, certainty, which attends the successful action of the organs of cognition proper. The first of these is clearly a value which may or may not exist, demanding, as it does, definite scientific plans. It is, moreover, irrelevant to the nature of knowledge itself. Success as the realization of scientific ideals results from the possession of the truth. This latter is the genuine cognitive act yielding the true cognitive value, certainty, which, while it may condition the fulfilment of a conscious purpose to know, is not identical therewith, and may exist separately. The difference here is analogous to that between the value which is the positive feeling of success in having painted a good picture, and the esthetic value in contemplating it, without which the former can not be known. The one is the pleasure in triumph, the other is the pleasure in knowing. With this last we are alone concerned. How is it related to truth, what are the epistemological implications of its indubitable existence?

In the first place, it is a purely "formal" pleasure. It does not predetermine the nature of truth or reality, one whit. Any sort of truth is consonant with it. The world might have such a character as would involve the destruction of all human interests and still be matter for knowledge and so of this value. The value of having the truth might coexist with and condition the loss of all other values.

Secondly, this value does not afford any safe criterion of truth. In itself it is, like all other feelings, liable to go astray and so mislead as to its import. The real truth-character of an idea is internal to its nature, independent of the feeling of certainty, and properly determinative of this. Consider the simplest possible case.

Take my idea of San Francisco. This idea is true, if it is capable of fulfillment, that is, if its meaning can be filled out in the perception of the city—if there is nothing in the idea which contradicts perception. The idea is true if it fits the sensible experience of the fact as a cap fits the head, or, viewing the matter from the other side, if the perception fits into the idea as the head fits into the "space" of the cap. An idea is true so far as it vicariously contains its object

—the test is the attempted fitting in of the object. In all adequate perception this is realized. The object itself is given in perception and *into* the idea. This filling in of the meaning of an idea is a unique experience; in it, or in the potentiality of it, consists the possession of the truth. This experience either as a “disposition” (felt possibility) or as an actuality *conditions* certainty as the value of knowledge. *This* is the truth-character of the idea; its *value*, the positive feeling which accompanies it, has in itself no cognitive importance.

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ART AND SCIENCE

“**B**ETTER to take pleasure in a rose than to put its root under a microscope,” said Oscar Wilde.

The defenders of the uniqueness of art, the absoluteness of beauty, and the indescribable character of appreciation hold that science by its very nature and the presuppositions of its method is unfit to understand or explain, much less interpret and evaluate, artistic and esthetic objects—either because the methods of science are too coarse and crude to sense the subtle nuances of beauty, or because science is only concerned with describing relations and assigning causes and is thus precluded from knowing the reality itself, or, again, because the knowledge which science gains is always abstract and generic whereas the thing of beauty is concrete and individual.

I

Ruskin held that the beauty of natural objects contains qualities which so far have eluded the description and classification of the man of science. The method of the artist, he says, is intuitive. “His faculty of perception penetrates far deeper than the instrument of the student. The labor of the whole geological society for the last fifty years has but now arrived at the ascertainment of those truths respecting mountain-form which Turner saw and expressed with a few strokes of a camel’s-hair pencil fifty years ago when he was a boy. . . . The knowledge of all the laws of the planetary system, and of all the curves of the motions of projectiles, would never enable a man of science to draw a waterfall or a wave.” “Would the teaching of philosophers who describe this world in terms so abstruse, so gray, and so cold, ever lead us to imagine it to be such a shimmer of foliage, such a flood of sunshine, such a pulsation of life, such a tremor of eyelids and fire of glances, as indeed